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ABSTRACT 
 
This study has three broad aims: (i) to describe the overall strategies of the unemployed in 
the Romanian transitional economy, and offer a few predictors for each strategy, (ii) to test the extent 
to which the informal labor market represent an alternative for these people, and (iii) to provide an 
evaluation of the dimension of the informal economic sector in Romania, as far as the “gray labor” 
component is involved. 
The sources of data we used are diverse: our own survey on the unemployed population in 
two different regions of Romania (Bucharest, with low unemployment, and Piatra Neamt, a 
provincial town in an economically depressed region, with high unemployment); the results of the 
Romanian Barometer of Opinion; and various cross-country assessments of the informal economic 
sector. We conclude that working in the gray sector is only in small measure a matter of choice for 
the unemployed, at least in regions like Neamt, where few alternatives exist even for the relatively 
young, skilled and entrepreneurial people. While in Bucharest the job market is tight and 
unemployment largely voluntary (or even benefit-induced), in Piatra Neamt around 30% of it is 
recession-induced and comprises people who are more dynamic and flexible than the business 
environment - small wonder then that they work underground. An overall estimate of the hidden GDP 
due to the economic activity of the unemployed yields the result of 2% in Bucharest and 6-10% in 
Piatra Neamt. However, at this point we cannot estimate the size of two other important components 
of the informal economy: the black market (purely criminal activities) and the unreported activities of 
those agents who do not use unemployed labor. The study concludes with policy recommendations. 
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1. Analytical approach 
The last decade has witnessed an increase in research on informal economic activity, both in 
developing or transitional economies (de Soto 1989; Johnson, Kaufman & Schleifer 1998) and in 
industrialized countries (Dangler 1994; Marcelli 1999). Recent work has only partly supported the 
dominant neoclassical economic view that the informal economy (henceforth IE) offers a solution to 
unemployment and poverty. As de Soto (1989:185) put it, “the choice between working formally and 
informally is not the inevitable result of people’s individual traits but, rather, of their rational 
evaluation of the relative costs and benefits of entering existing legal systems.” Sociologists in the 
structuralist tradition however have denied that informality is exogenous to the labor market, and a 
by-product of extra-economic state regulations, claiming instead that it is a by-product of firms’ 
constantly seeking to restructure production and lower costs, and is therefore endogenous to the labor 
market. Opinions are split concerning the unicity or duality of the labor market (Borjas 1990; de 
Freitas 1991; Gordon, Edwards and Reich 1982). The neo-institutionalist approach assumes that 
informal employment is part of the non-primary labor market, and therefore a complement to the 
formal one. The existence of informal workers is not seen in this approach to have a negative impact 
on the primary sector; on the contrary, it may benefit formal workers and firms by performing 
necessary but less desirable tasks at a lower cost and without an official work contract (Marcelli 
1999). 
Concerning transitional economies of what was formerly known as the “second world,” we 
can again distinguish two opposing views. One claims that the growth of the official economy is 
hindered by the informal economy, emphasizing the negative social capital of mafia-like economic 
activity and large-scale tax evasion. This argument is mostly put forward in analyses of the Russian 
economy. The opposing view claims that it is the poor performance of the government that pushes 
entrepreneurs outside the formal sector, in search of the best combination of taxes and public goods 
(Johnson, Kaufman and Shleifer 1998). 
In this study, the informal economy is understood as the economic activity that is not reported 
to the statistical office, although it should be according to law. In the following we plan to: 
i. Describe the overall strategies of the unemployed in the Romanian transitional economy, and 
offer a few predictors for each strategy; 
ii. Examine the extent to which the IE is an alternative in the labor market; and 
iii. Provide collateral data for an evaluation of the dimension of the IE in Romania (since 
existing data is inconsistent.) 
 
2. Measurements of the hidden sector 
Data concerning the IE are by definition difficult to obtain. Official statistics in particular 
capture the phenomenon only with extreme difficulty. In 1996 the Romanian National Commission of 
Statistics (CNS) argued that the figures submitted by the Romanian Service of Information (SRI) - 
which, in an unpublished report to the Parliament, put the IE at about 40% of the GDP- are strongly 
overestimated, in fact almost double the real figures. A report by the US Treasury issued to the 
Romanian press seems to support the SRI estimation rather than that of CNS (French 1999). More 
modest figures, close to the CNS estimation of around 20%, however, were obtained from the 
Johnson, Kaufman & Schleifer (1998) comprehensive comparative survey based on electricity 
consumption. 
The US treasury study is the most recent, and it claims that the IE has grown significantly, 
compared to previous studies of earlier years. On the other hand the method employed by this study, 
based on monetary aggregates (the “cash-demand” approach), is considered least appropriate for 
transition countries, where macro figures are unreliable, the economic activity highly volatile and 
where a substantial part of the “white” transactions take place in cash. Moreover, the elegant 
monetary approach has been long known to produce the highest, most spectacular estimates of the 
hidden sector1 - which explains the findings of the American team in our case. 
                                                          
1
 One such study concluded that the share of the hidden sector in the US economy in 1979 was almost 30%. 
Other studies put the figure at 33%. If true – which seems unlikely – the Romanian figure mentioned above 
looks rather like an underestimation (Skoka 1989). 
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 Other methods that are less simple to apply, yield more conservative results: the “Palermo” 
approach, comparing reported income with the local “visible” consumption; the labor force approach 
which counts people, not money flows; and the survey approach (Alessandrini and Dallago 1989). 
These methods look at more than one factor at a time and employ many checks based on common 
sense – hence their apparent imprecision. In exchange, they can offer invaluable insights into the 
phenomena going on at the micro level. Creative combinations of these methods, adjusted to the 
particularities of different regions, lead to results which are widely regarded as good approximations 
of reality, such as Loayza’s (1996) study of Latin America, which undertook a MIMIC (Multiple 
Indicator-Multiple Causes) assessment. Finally, Kaufman and Kaliberda (1996) estimated the 
underground economy in post-communist countries by looking at variations in the total electricity 
consumption. This offers a rough measure of the overall economic activity. It was empirically 
confirmed that the GDP-to-electricity-consumption elasticity is close to one in the short run. The 
differences in variation of GDP and power consumed should therefore be attributed to informal 
economic activity. 
 Another possibility is to use the consultancy-type sectorial analysis based on expert 
evaluations. This is less likely to produce precise aggregate figures but is very good as a starting 
point, playing the role of a preliminary focus group in the process of designing a comprehensive 
survey. The sectorial analysis can indicate where to look for shadow economic activity, and it helps in 
ranking the economic sectors according to their affinity for informal transactions. It can also point out 
regional differences that should be taken into account in the design of the research. For example, in 
many OECD countries domestic employment and drug trafficking represent important parts of the 
gray and black markets respectively2. By contrast, in the post-communist countries there is not very 
much domestic labor paid for in cash, but there is much more barter going on in the agro-food sector. 
Moreover, the black market is less developed in drugs or arms, while it is believed to be more active 
in the smuggling of highly taxed consumption goods (tobacco, alcohol, coffee, etc.) and in the 
collection of protection fees, especially in the former Soviet countries. But both in developed and 
developing countries, CEE included, certain industries such as construction or transportation are 
known to shelter a great deal of informal activity. 
Figure 1 presents the dimension of the informal economy in a series of countries, as given in 
the study of Johnson, Kaufman and Shleifer (1998). Data were adjusted for comparability reasons – 
but, as the authors themselves suggest, they should still be taken cum grano salis, given the 
differences in methodology used: in Eastern Europe the estimations are based on electricity 
consumption; in Latin America on Loayza’s composite index; and in the OECD countries on the 
currency-demand approach. Most probably the OECD figures are slightly overestimated compared 
with the other two. 
 
3. Methodology 
We do not attempt to propose here an alternative way of measuring the national IE. This 
would be far beyond the scope of this study. We are interested in the informal economy only as an 
alternative “survival strategy” for the unemployed. But we look nevertheless at the significance and 
implications of the unemployed hidden activity for the national economy. 
In drawing our sample of unemployed the following considerations were applied: 
1. Our intention was to capture the difference between the capital, Bucharest, which has the 
lowest level of unemployment (5.3% at the end of 1999) and a provincial region strongly affected by 
the transitional de-industralization, with a consequent high level of unemployment (without, however, 
being a region too specifically tied to one industrial sector such as mining). Neamţ is a county with 
one of the highest unemployment rates in the country, 18.5%. In 1999, according to the Romanian 
National Commission of Statistics (CNS 2000), Piatra Neamţ, the capital of the county, Neamţ 
recorded 10,432 unemployed out of a total population of 124, 859. In Bucharest, on the other hand, 
we had a pool of 43,078 recorded unemployed out of a total population of 2,013,911. It was assumed 
that inhabitants of Bucharest have more opportunities and are able to cope better with unemployment. 
                                                          
2
 We use the common distinction between gray activities (legal in principle, but unreported and untaxed) and 
black ones (illegal per se). 
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Figure 1 Size of the informal sector, % of the official GDP: CEE, Latin America, OECD 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Norway
UK
Switzerland
Japan
Denmark
Canada
Sweden
Germany
France 
USA
Belgium
Spain
Italy
Greece
Chile
Argentina
Mexico
Uruguay
Colombia
Brasil
Peru
Panama
Bolivia
Slovakia
Czech R.
Estonia
Poland
Romania
Lithuania
Hungary
Bulgaria
Russia
Ukraine
Georgia
 
(Johnson, Kaufman and Zoido-Lobaton, 1998) 
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2. Our second objective was to be able to compare our results with the data from polls with 
national representativness. The sample included 200 officially recorded unemployed in Piatra Neamţ 
and 204 unemployed recorded in the six districts of Bucharest. The poll was designed by SAR and 
conducted between 13-20 September 1999 by the Romanian polling institute CURS. The results were 
compared with CURS data from the Romanian Public Opinion Barometer (BOP 1999) measured by 
the same institute on the general population of Romania in October 1999. 
The sample obtained was surprisingly similar to the national sample in terms of both income 
and attitudes. Our unemployed fare no better or worse than average Romanians; peasants and retired 
people obviously earn even less than the unemployed, making the two samples comparable. This 
relatively good situation of the unemployed is due to welfare benefits. In Romania there are two types 
of welfare benefits for the unemployed. During the first nine months of unemployment the individual 
receives aid “for unemployment and professional readjustment” (ranging from a minimum of 22% to 
a maximum of 55% of the national gross average income). For the next 18 months he or she receives 
a more modest “support” aid (60% of the unemployment aid). The sample was equally divided to 
include the two categories, and stratified in Bucharest to be representative of the structure of 
unemployment for the six quite different districts (each of which is larger than the town of Piatra 
Neamţ). 
The subjective evaluation of one’s life and of the whole country’s situation presents no 
statistically significant differences between our sample and the BOP one (see Appendix 1). The 
unemployed in our sample are the typical poor in a poor society; most of them earn below the 
national income average, but so do the people in the BOP sample, as the following table shows. 
In order to go beyond the average income and grasp the diversity of our sample’s economic 
situation, we calculated the deciles of unemployed households’ incomes on the basis of the BOP 
general population figures, differentiating between the national and urban samples. We then 
calculated the percentage of unemployed households which fall in each decile. 
 
Table 1 Comparative income of the unemployed and the general population 
 
Average income Bucharest Piatra 
Neamţ 
Cummulative 
Bucharest-
Piatra Neamţ 
BOP 
(Urban) 
BOP 
(National) 
Official 
national 
urban 
figures 
Average 
household income 
 
1.9 
 
1.5 
 
1.7 
 
2.4 
 
2.0 
 
1.7 
Average 
individual income 
 
0.5 
 
0.4 
 
0.5 
 
0.7 
 
0.6 
 
0.5 
Note:  All figures in million Romanian Lei 
 
Less than 5% of our sample is included in the first decile, comprising the poorest households, 
which is well below the national sample. This supports our observation that the poorest individuals 
are not drawn from the pool of recorded and assisted unemployed, even if the level of assistance is 
extremely modest (the figures vary, but the support aid amounts to a maximum 35 USD per month). 
This support is therefore essential for preventing people from falling into the lowest category of 
poverty. 
In the urban environment however the picture changes. The number of households in the 
poorest category is above the national urban level, 12.5% for Bucharest and 31.5% for Piatra Neamţ. 
Even if they are poorer than the average urban dwellers, there is indirect evidence that the urban 
unemployed are better off than peasants who do not receive any form of state support. This explains 
the change of picture seen in shifting from the national to the urban level. 
This conclusion is also supported by the number of home appliances found in the 
unemployed households. The unemployed have as many home appliances as the average Romanian 
household, scoring well on color TV-sets, washing machines and cars. The percentage of cable 
subscribers is also similar to the national average of 64.4%, impressively high for a population with 
an average income of about 100 USD per household. The cost of a cable subscription is about 3 or 4 
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USD/month, so the figure is telling for the life-style of Romanians. Even the poorest make a 
substantial contribution from their income for family entertainment. 
 
Figure 2 Percentage of unemployed households compared with the general population 
national deciles (BOP) 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Unemployed households compared with the general population urban sample 
deciles (BOP) 
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One specificity of the Romanian situation is the large number of people who benefited from 
the restitution of land after 1989. Before the onset of communism Romania had a large number of 
small landowners (strip farmers). The 1990 provisional government and the government subsequently 
elected on May 20, led by Petre Roman, promoted a policy of further fragmentation: land was either 
returned or redistributed from the former kolhozes to individual owners in very small plots of only 1 
ha on average. It was assumed that ownership of land in the rural area plays an economic role in the 
survival of the urban unemployed - although not a decisive one, since 1 ha is not enough for even a 
childless family to live on. 
 
4. Determinants of participation in the informal economy 
A total of 45.5% of our sampled unemployed have some IE activity, of which 28% have had 
more than one occupation in the unofficial sector. The Piatra Neamţ sample is much more active than 
their counterparts in Bucharest, as Figure 4 shows. 
We recorded as IE participation the presence of at least one activity, even occasional, which 
is very likely not to be taxed, such as small trade, day labor and domestic services of all kinds (see 
Appendix 2). Thus only a small portion of this IE activity is self-employment and this is then direct 
tax evasion; most of it rather involves work without a legal contract, on a less-than-permanent basis. 
 
Figure 4 Participation of unemployed in the informal economy 
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It was assumed that IE work is determined by necessity rather than choice. This implies that 
more motivated and active subjects with less choice (i.e. fewer resources other than their own work 
during the unemployment period) will engage more in IE activity regardless of their general opinion 
about working without a contract. However, they achieve nothing more than sheer survival. In other 
words, work in the informal sector, according to our model, does not necessarily drain resources off 
the formal economy. Due to the small sums earned in this manner it is clear that the main motivation 
is to make a living. It is very likely that employers could not afford to offer contracts on such limited 
amounts of money and work, and the unemployed could not survive if the same amount of money 
would be further reduced by taxation. 
The dependent variable in our model is therefore the subjects’ IE activity. The independent 
variables (predictors) we tested are: 
a) social structure items (age, sex, education, number of children per household, number of 
household members, number of people active per household, residence, ownership of land, 
household income, nature of income - transient or permanent, and willingness to change 
occupation) 
b) material status (constructed as factor score from the reported income and a cumulative index of 
home appliance ownership) 
c) occupational background 
d) number of months unemployed 
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e) motivation factors (scores on INPUT or DEMAND3) 
f) resources for surviving unemployment behavior : ACTIVES or PASSIVES in looking for a 
new job4 (see Appendix 3 for personal strategies in finding work). 
We tested the independent variables first in bivariate logistic models. Significant variables 
were then tested in a multiple logistic regression model (see Appendix 4). The final model predicts 
73% of individual cases, with a R2=0,35. In the bivariate analysis, the predictors of work in the 
informal economy are the following: 
i. ACTIVES. Being more active and entrepreneurial in looking for a job increases the chances 
of working in the informal sector. IE jobs are an obvious alternative to those in the formal economy. 
Active unemployed people have tried many other possibilities to find a job: if they end up in the 
informal sector this is due to the lack of any acceptable alternative in the formal economy. Passives 
have less chances to work in the IE because they have fewer chances to work in general. The sample 
was, however, split over the choice between a contract job with less money (58%) and a better paid 
job without contract (42%), without this variable becoming a predictor. In normal life, however, 
people do not even have a choice: only 16.3% of the unemployed in our sample were offered a job by 
the Unemployment Office (OFM). People who declared their willingness to change residence in order 
to find a job had more chances to work in the informal sector. 
ii. MOTIVATION. Being high on INPUT increases the chances of working in the informal 
sector. More motivated people will simply search harder and do any kind of work. High expectations 
towards the state’s role and low expectations towards one’s basic life needs (high score on 
DEMAND) bring about less entrepreneurial behavior in finding work. 
iii. GENDER. Being a woman decreases the possibility of working in the IE sector. Many 
explanations compete here, such as the already reported little willingness of private employers to hire 
women, the more physical nature of occasional jobs, the fact that women are occupied more in the 
household. 
iv. WILINGNESS TO CHANGE OCCUPATION; PREVIOUS OCCUPATION AND 
EXPERIENCE. Individuals willing to change their occupation and learn other skills are more likely 
to engage in IE according to the bivariate analysis. People who worked in industry, construction, 
telecommunications and transport, on the other hand, are more likely to work in the informal sector 
than are people with a record of previous employment in education or health. This is due to the fact 
that education and health are still overwhelmingly in the state sector, so formal or informal private 
alternatives are not available. On the contrary, the private sector is drawing massively upon 
construction and transportation. Another factor is the very special qualification of individuals from 
the education and health sectors, the higher costs invested in this type of education prevents them 
from finding related work as easily as people with a background in industry or infrastructure building 
or maintenance. 
v. FLEXIBILITY. People who believe experience is essential in finding a workplace are less 
likely to engage in IE activity. Experience measured in years is an indicator of flexibility rather than 
of anything else. People who stick to their previous work experience are less mobile and so less likely 
                                                          
3
  Input and demand scores were based on following items: 
- ‘An ordinary person can do little to help himself if he/she becomes unemployed.’ 
- ‘People do not need much to live on.’ 
- ‘The state should provide work for everyone.’ 
- ‘The state should pay support aid for an undetermined period of time.’ (DEMAND) ‘Industrious people can 
find a way to manage if they become unemployed.’ 
- ‘You need to earn pretty well to live a decent life nowadays.’ 
- ‘People who really look for it do find work in the end.’ 
- ‘All that the state should do is provide an initial aid so that people can afterwards manage on their own’ 
(INPUT). 
4
 People were divided into two categories of ACTIVES and PASSIVES using a score based on a cumulated 
index, made of the following variables: 
- Asked for a job at the Unemployed Office. 
- Developed alternative strategies to find work. 
- Tried to find work in another town or abroad. 
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to accept any kind of work. The last two predictors are so strong that they remain significant in the 
multivariate model. 
vi. NATURE OF INCOME. People who rely on a fixed income, such as a pension or a wage of 
some family member in the household, are less likely to work in the IE. This resource seems to give 
more room for a choice between immediately going into the informal sector and waiting for some 
better opportunity. Since in many instances this opportunity is unavailable for pure economic reasons 
(absence of demand in the official labor market), people relying on such incomes are simply going to 
be unemployed for a longer period of time than the rest. 
vii. OWNERSHIP OF LAND. The unemployed who own land are more likely to engage in IE 
activity. Land is also an important factor in the multivariate analysis, although respondents tend to 
diminish its importance when subjectively stating the importance of their resources. Although 
respondents tend to minimize the importance of land-based resources for their household when asked 
directly, it is clear that the resources from the land and the time spent to work it force people to turn 
mostly to part-time jobs in the informal sector rather than full-time jobs in the formal one. Land 
ownership is not enough to live on, but provides some basis for autonomy. 
viii. RESIDENCE. Residence in Piatra Neamţ, a provincial town with high unemployment, 
significantly increases the chances of working in the IE, as compared to residence in Bucharest, 
where work in the formal sector is easier to find. The general profile of the unemployed in Bucharest 
shows them to be more pessimistic, more pretentious and less active overall. Economic conditions in 
Bucharest vary greatly from those in Piatra Neamţ. Fewer factories were closed in Bucharest, and the 
private sector is the most highly developed in Romania. People who are unemployed and continue to 
stay so in Bucharest are unlikely to have been victims of sudden and massive layoffs, as in Piatra 
Neamţ. The reason for their unemployment is more likely related to personal choice than to structural 
problems of the regional economy. 
ix. HISTORY OF UNEMPLOYMENT. The number of months of unemployment is a predictor 
in both the bivariate and the multivariate analyses. The longer the history on the dole, the greater the 
chances are that the individual will become engaged in IE. This again seems to indicate that need and 
not choice is the main drive pushing people to seek work without contract. 
Only a few social structural items are predictors for IE participation: gender, occupational 
background and the nature of income are predictors in the multivariate analysis; while age, education, 
number of children and material status do not seem to differentiate between those involved in IE and 
those who are not (see Appendix 4). Two categories of conclusions can be drawn from here: 
 
A. A model of individual choice when there is no choice 
Working in the informal sector is only to a very small extent a matter of choice. Romanians 
are not particularly inclined towards working in the shadow economy without a contract, but they 
experience that working in the state sector is not a guarantee of survival. In many state enterprises 
wages are delayed, unpaid or reduced to such an extent that they are no higher than the 
unemployment benefit. It is revealing to compare the self-declared willingness to work without 
contract for a decent pay with the self-reports of engagement in such work. The majority of 
individuals engaged in work without a contract would actually prefer to work with a contract, even 
for less money, if they were given the choice; while 22% of the total sample indicate a preference for 
better paid work without a contract, but are actually not involved in IE. 
 
Table 2 Working preferences of the unemployed (willingness towards work without 
contract and actual involvement 
 Unemployed not 
working in the IE 
Unemployed, at least 
one activity in the IE 
Total 
Unemployed who would prefer a 
better paid job without an official 
work contract 
87 
21.8% 
 
81 
20.3% 
168 
42% 
Unemployed who would prefer an 
official contract job with less money 
129 
32.3% 
103 
25.8% 
232 
58% 
Total 216 
54% 
184 
46% 
400 
100% 
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As in Bucharest, people would rather stay unemployed than engage in IE. In poorer Piatra 
Neamţ, where alternatives are scarce, people engage more in IE, but they would rather work in the 
formal sector had any choice been offered. For a particular individual the model can predict fairly 
well if he or she will engage in IE, work in the formal sector if given the opportunity, or stay 
unemployed. By and large it is clear that work in the public sector is a survival strategy of ‘the most 
fit’ due to a lack of alternatives, rather than an option to increase personal profit. A majority would 
prefer a work contract, but cross-tabulation of the sector preference with the actual work behavior 
shows that choice is severely limited. More people would work in the informal sector than those who 
actually can find work, and the incomes earned are barely enough for survival. The informal sector 
actually acts as a second vital source in addition to the welfare support granted by the state, which 
allows households to survive. The Bucharest unemployed have more choice in their economic 
environment, but they are more likely to stay unemployed, since they do not fit into the general model 
of the more entrepreneurial unemployed. 
All other things being equal, the same type of individual now engaged in the informal sector 
will find work in the formal sector – the only difference being that, for now, the demand in the formal 
sector in non-existent. Our model is therefore in agreement with neoclassical economic theory. 
 
B. The types of unemployment 
The nature of unemployment is quite different in Bucharest and Piatra Neamţ, so we can 
distinguish two different types of unemployment. The differences between Bucharest and Piatra 
Neamţ are statistically significant, although individuals can be found who do not match the general 
types. 
i. The Bucharest unemployment figure is low (5.3%) and a large voluntary component seems to 
be involved: 
- there is a tight labor market (higher average salaries) 
- 1/3 of the unemployment is due to professional rigidity (people do not want to re-train for 
another job) or lack of interest in getting a job5 
- the Bucharest unemployed are more pessimistic and more difficult to satisfy. This 
corresponds to the profile of lower subjective welfare in wealthier regions (Ravallion and 
Lokshin 1998) 
- the Bucharest unemployed do not need to be as active, since their families can often afford to 
support them via intra-family help in cash. 
ii. The unemployment in Piatra Neamţ is high (18.5%) and mixed: 
- lower average salaries are found on the employers’ market 
- 40% of the unemployment is structural 
- 28% is due to local economic rigidities, the individuals being more dynamic and flexible than 
the business environment; so this component can be considered recession-induced 
unemployment 
- the unemployed are more professionally flexible and entrepreneurial than their Bucharest 
counterparts, and are willing to re-train and adjust to the demands of the informal sector 
- the Neamţ unemployed have a more positive attitude, being more optimistic and having 
higher subjective well-being, which is consistent with the standard profile in a poorer region 
(Ravallion and Lokshin 1998) 
- their immediate needs are oriented more towards investment than consumption 
- families provide help in food more often than in cash, probably from village to town, as they 
did on a wider scale before 1989. This is consistent with the rural setting of Piatra Neamţ, a 
newer town in which the majority of inhabitants are the first urban generation. 
                                                          
5
 In the latter situation these people should not have been included in the statistics in the first place, since they do 
not fit the basic definition of unemployment: individuals who are willing to work and actively looking for a 
job. What we have here is a clear case of benefit-induced unemployment. 
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5. Evaluation of the hidden GDP 
In order to estimate the additional contribution to the total economic output due to the 
unemployed individuals’ unofficial activity, as a percentage of the officially reported GDP, the 
analysis should be pursued in a few successive steps. 
1. First, the share of the hidden labor market due to unemployed people (Lg/L = Lg/U*U/L) can 
be inferred from our survey data (Ug) and the official unemployment figures available, at the national 
level and in the two regions (U). 
 
Table 3 Participation in the informal labor market 
 Lg/U - % of Unemployed 
working in IE 
U/L - Unemployment rate 
(1999), % 
Lg/L - 'Gray' labor 
force, % 
Bucharest 34 5.3 1.8 
Neamţ  57 18.5 10.5 
Total 45 12.2 5.5 
  
As we see, the real labor force is 5.5 percent larger than that officially recorded if we take 
into consideration the unemployed who are active in the informal sector. However, there is a wide 
regional variation in this respect. In Bucharest the figure is only two percent, while in the Neamţ 
county the difference is more than five times as large. 
2. Next we have to estimate how much this extra labor force adds to the total output, which is a 
more tricky thing to do. We can start with the simple Cobb-Douglass production function (Ray 1998): 
Y = AKαL1-α 
where Y is the total output, K the available capital, and L the labor employed. A is a positive constant 
that measures the degree of technological knowledge and 0 < α < 1 (the share of the capital income.) 
So the extra output associated with gray labor, as a share of the total GDP, is thus: 
Yg/Y = AKgαLg1-α/AKαL1-α = (Kg/K) α (Lg/L)1-α 
The problem now is to approximate α. This is mostly guesswork in our context. Nevertheless, 
there are a few hints we can make use of. 
• In the developing countries, where most of the production is labor intensive, α tends to be situated 
in the lower half of the interval (Ray 1998). 
• It is also known that post-communist countries use their stock of capital less efficiently than other 
countries with similar levels of development. This is especially true in Romania, due to the high 
distortions provoked by the investment policies of the 70s and 80s. 
All these considerations suggest that in the Romanian economy α tends to be closer to 0 than 
1. Figure 5 gives an estimate of the hidden GDP created by the unemployed, for values of α between 
0.1 and 0.5, calculated with the formula above. 
3. It is perfectly reasonable to assume that the extra labor in the hidden sector is also associated 
with the participation of an unknown amount of hidden capital (Kg). Even though this capital may be 
small or low in quality, it is probably put to use more efficiently than that inherited in the official 
industrial sector. But the same reasoning applies to labor productivity: in the hidden sector it is likely 
to be comparatively higher, in spite of the lower skills and qualifications of the unemployed 
population. Indeed, they may be even more productive in real terms, if we take into consideration that 
more than a quarter have two or more jobs in the underground economy. Therefore, the capital inputs 
in the informal sector add some extra output to the hidden GDP calculated above. Still, since the 
hidden sector is low-skilled and labor intensive, it is unlikely that Kg/K is greater than Lg/L. In 
Figure 5 we should therefore take into consideration only the variations to the left of the intersection 
points – i.e. Kg/K = 10.5% for Piatra Neamţ, 1.8% for Bucharest and 5.5% on average. 
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Figure 5 Hidden GDP variation with the unemployed labor participation,  
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4. The curves allow us to estimate that the proportion of the “hidden” GDP due to the activities 
of the unemployed in the informal economy is somehow smaller than the corresponding proportion in 
the total labor force, calculated in step 1 – and the difference is greater when the unemployment is 
higher (i.e. in Neamţ). True, the gray output might be slightly underestimated here in real terms. 
Unlike the rest of the economy, the informal sector produces only real (as opposed to virtual) GDP, 
since it is not subsidized, does not subtract value by offering unwanted goods and services, does not 
deliver to customers who are not solvable, and thus does not contribute to the arrears problem. While 
these phenomena are marginal or non-existent in other developed or developing countries, they 
represent an important source of distortions in the post-communist economies, which must be kept in 
mind when analyzing aggregate data. But in spite of this underestimation, the share of gray GDP 
cannot be much higher than the corresponding share of gray labor (Lg/L), even with substantial gray 
capital involved (Kg). 
In conclusion, our estimation is that the unemployed working in the informal sector add no 
more than 4 to 6% on average to the official GDP. Their contribution is unevenly distributed 
geographically: 
• Up to 2% in Bucharest, where there are fewer people officially registered as unemployed (the 
percentage may be higher since casual evidence indicates that the capital involved in informal 
activities here is more significant). 
• 6 to10% in Neamţ, where there is less voluntary unemployment and the official GDP per capita 
is also smaller.6 
If this is true, it seems that the poorer a county, the higher the amount of the “gray” GDP that 
must be added to the officially calculated GDP. Thus the informal economic sector which hires 
unemployed people functions like an equalizer across regions in Romania. 
 We must stress again that our evaluation in this paper concerns only the share of the informal 
sector due to the participation of the unemployed (i). The whole informal economy has at least two 
other significant components: (ii) the black market (criminal activities), and (iii) the unreported 
activities of the economic agents who do not employ gray labor. We are not able at this point to 
estimate their size, nor the degree of overlap among the three. However, looking at the figures 
calculated above for the first component, we have a strong feeling that the total size of the informal 
sector in Romania would come closer to the conservative figures of Johnson, Kaufman and Shleifer 
(approximately 20%) rather than those of the US Treasury team (40%) mentioned above. 
 
6. Policy Recommendations 
6.1. Repression is useless in this segment of the informal economy 
Our findings dispute the idea that normal growth is somehow prevented by the existence of a 
large gray economy. As long as the evidence indicates that this gray economy is rather a survival 
strategy in very poor regions deeply affected by the recession a repressive policy would bring little 
benefit. Repressive policies should focus on the other two components (the black market and tax 
evasion in the formal sector with or without the approval of the Ministry of Finance), especially in the 
poorer regions where unemployment is largely non-voluntary. There is little to gain from combating 
the first (i) segment of IE in these regions, especially since it will shrink naturally as economic 
growth picks up. Tax breaks would also be of little help, since most of these jobs are occasional, 
poorly paid, and practiced among individuals and not businesses. A tax break or across-the-board 
decrease in taxation would not push these people into the formal sector. 
 
6.2. Do not play with the tax system; address the real problems – bureaucratic over-
regulation, corruption, and weakness of the legal system. 
Given the temporary character of the jobs in this segment of the labor market, it is unlikely 
that lower taxation would be a stimulus strong enough for employers to officially register their 
operations. As Friedman et al. (1999) show, it is not high taxation that keeps these entrepreneurs 
                                                          
6
 GDP per capita is not divided according to region in the official statistics, but we can infer at least the direction 
of the regional disparities by looking at proxies such as average wage, share of service sector, etc. 
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underground, but precisely the vicious circle of unnecessary bureaucratization, low tax revenues and 
poor provision of public goods such as uncorrupt government, law and order and good infrastructure. 
 
6.3. Unemployment benefit regulations should be tightened; a more pro-active policy is 
necessary. 
The unemployed are not the worst off in Romanian society. Welfare benefits are small, but so 
are the wages in the state sector, which are sometimes even more unreliable, while pensions for 
peasants are ridiculously small (some are as low as 50 cents per month). The existence of a large 
number of unemployed displaying a passive pattern of behavior towards finding new work, regardless 
of sector, points to the idea that the indiscriminate granting of welfare and unemployment benefits 
leads to some benefit-induced unemployment. Regulations should be tightened and attempts to find 
work should be given more careful scrutiny in order to encourage the unemployed to be more active 
and responsible. More effort should be directed towards encouraging and assisting individuals to 
become self-employed, which is a strategy rarely pursued. 
 
6.4. Different regional approaches corresponding to different regional conditions are 
needed. 
A good policy should discriminate between the various regions. A “national policy” in this 
area is neither possible nor desirable. Creating a tight conditioning of welfare benefits to encourage 
more active individual strategies in finding work would probably reduce the rate of unemployment in 
Bucharest by canceling its benefit-induced segment. In Piatra Neamţ however, most people are 
already working hard to find an alternative survival strategy, so that consideration should be given to 
the question of how to assist people willing to relocate in order to find work. Regional programs of 
economic development and/or rehabilitation should be initiated. 
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APPENDIX 1A & B  Subjective perception of economic status (%) 
 
How do you evaluate your family income? Bucharest Piatra 
Neamţ 
BOP 
a. It is not enough to live on 45.2 44.5 39.2 
b. It is barely enough to live on 39.7 40 42.3 
 c. It is enough for a decent living, but we cannot afford 
more expensive goods 
13.1 12 15.2 
d. We can sometimes afford expensive goods, but we 
have to restrict spending for other goods or services 
2 3.5 2.8 
e. No budget constraints   0.5 
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APPENDIX 2  Sources of income supplementary to welfare benefits 
 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Small trade
Craft-work
Domestic services
Day labor
Yes No
 
 
Note: The sum of ‘Yes’ answers is more than 45.5% (the percentage of unemployed who work in the informal 
sector) because some people report more than one occupation. 
% 
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APPENDIX 3  Strategies for fighting unemployment 
 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Follow ads
Post own ads
Call personally
Inquire in close
neighborhood
Trial time without
payment
Re-train
Start own business
Yes No
 
 
 
APPENDIX 4  Multivariate Regression Model 
Predictors of Work in Informal Sector 
 
Variable   B  Sig  Exp(B) 
 
LAND OWNERSHIP  .3073  .6257  1.3598 
INPUT    .5481  .0276  1.7300 
DEMAND   .4336  .1497  1.5428 
HISTORY   .0537  .0014  1.0552 
FEMALE   -.1987  .0452  .8198 
EDUCATION   .3538  .1588  1.4245 
BUCHAREST   -.7239  .0056  .4848 
BACKGROUND-INDUSTRY .9429  .0005  2.5674 
BACKGROUND 
    TRANSPORTATION 1.3627  .0213  3.9069 
WILLINGNESS TO 
     CHANGE OCCUPATION .0039  .1622  1.0039 
PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES -.0121  .9183  .9880 
CHANCE   -.1707  .1963  .8431 
FLEXIBILITY   -.1910  .0487  .8261 
ACTIVE   .8729  .0008  2.3938 
FIXED INCOME  -1.1044  .0001  .3314 
Constant   .4871  .6819 
N=400 
Nagelkerke - R^2 .350 
Overall Correct Percentage 73.25% 
